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Background: Poultry represents an important sector in animal production, with backyard flocks representing a
huge majority, especially in the developing countries. In these countries, villagers raise poultry to meet household
food demands and as additional sources of incomes. Backyard production methods imply low biosecurity measures
and high risk of infectious diseases, such as Newcastle disease or zoonosis such as Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI).
We reviewed literature on biosecurity practices for prevention of infectious diseases, and published
recommendations for backyard poultry and assessed evidence of their impact and feasibility, particularly in
developing countries. Documents were sourced from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) website, and
from Pubmed and Google databases.
Results: A total of 62 peer-reviewed and non-referred documents were found, most of which were published
recently (after 2004) and focused on HPAI/H5N1-related biosecurity measures (64%). Recommendations addressed
measures for flock management, feed and water management, poultry trade and stock change, poultry health
management and the risk to humans. Only one general guideline was found for backyard poultry-related
biosecurity; the other documents were drawn up for specific developing settings and only engaged their authors
(e.g. consultants). These national guidelines written by consultants generated recommendations regarding
measures derived from the highest standards of commercial poultry production. Although biosecurity principles of
isolation and containment are described in most documents, only a few documents were found on the impact of
measures in family poultry settings and none gave any evidence of their feasibility and effectiveness for backyard
poultry.
Conclusions: Given the persistent threat posed by HPAI/H5N1 to humans in developing countries, our findings
highlight the importance of encouraging applied research toward identifying sustained and adapted biosecurity
measures for smallholder poultry flocks in low-income countries.
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In 2009, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) estimated the global population
of domestic chickens and ducks at over 18 billion and 1
billion, respectively. Based on the number of animals,
poultry represents the largest domestic animal stock in
the world [1]. The industry is dominated by commercial
farms while in developing countries, production consists
of village or “backyard” (traditional) poultry, which is* Correspondence: aconan@hotmail.fr
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oroften extensive [2,3]. Backyard poultry is characterized
by small flocks with low biosecurity measures. Backyard
flocks represent around 80% of poultry stocks in many
developing countries [3,4], often consisting of free indi-
genous unselected breeds of various ages, with various
species mixed in the same flock [4-7]. Poultry closely
interact with humans in the same household as well as
with wild birds and other livestock where they are also
exposed to vermin and predators. Poor or absent disease
control strategies and inadequate management practices
result in high levels of baseline mortality due to preda-
tors (e.g. rodents, snakes, small carnivores) or infectious
diseases (e.g. Newcastle Disease (ND), salmonellosis,Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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poultry raising usually requires low investments and
death among poultry commonly occurs. As such poultry
raising is often not the primary source of livelihood for
backyard poultry farmers, nor is it the primary farming
activity. However, it contributes significantly to incomes
and home food consumption in rural areas of many
developing countries [13,14]. In some settings or condi-
tions, major losses of poultry flocks can result in malnu-
trition [15].
In several countries, poultry raising and consumption
are also linked to socio-cultural factors such as religion
or festivities [16-18], and to economic factors at farm
and national levels [2,19,20]. Moreover some infectious
poultry diseases are zoonotic, resulting in mild symp-
toms in humans (such as ND) [21], a range of mild to
serious diseases (such as campylobacteriosis or psitta-
cosis) [22,23] or can have fatal consequences in both
poultry and humans, such as the Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza (HPAI) A/H5N1 virus. Of these, some
have raised potential public health concerns [24]. To
avert human health risks and economic losses, biosecur-
ity measures are implemented in farms to prevent the
introduction, persistence or dissemination of infectious
agents, through isolation, traffic control and/or sanita-
tion measures. The rapid growth in intensive poultry
production combined with increasing animal and human
movement across the world is thought to have signifi-
cantly contributed to the emergence of new pathogens
(e.g. HPAI A/H5N1 or H9N2). However, in some set-
tings there is evidence of sustained dissemination of
these avian viruses between semi-extensive or backyard
poultry flocks from area to area [25]. Inadequate back-
yard flock hygiene highlights the issue of poultry disease
control in backyard systems [3,26]. In this context, we
conducted a systematic literature review to analyse the
evidence on the recommendations and use of biosecurity
measures adapted to backyard poultry with a particular
focus on developing countries.
Methods
Recognizing the complexity of production systems and
the fact that other terminologies have been used in vari-
ous countries to describe backyard poultry depending on
the differences in general husbandry and agricultural
systems, we developed a protocol that consisted of the
following items. Firstly, abiding by the PRISMA (Pre-
ferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses) requirements, we performed a system-
atic literature search using the United States National
Library of Medicine and the National Institutes of
Health Medical Database (PubMed) and Google with no
starting time limits, up until November 2011. As key-
words we selected “poultry” associated with any of thefollowing: “biosecurity”, “risk factors”, “knowledge”, “atti-
tude” or “practice”. “Risk factors” documents were
expected to provide recommendations on biosecurity
measures against infectious diseases; we expected the
studies on “Knowledge, Attitude and Practice” (KAP) to
describe biosecurity practices, highlighting the needs for
improvement.
Secondly, guided by several FAO staff members in the
Livestock Production Systems Branch, we obtained add-
itional unpublished documents and reports directly from
the Agriculture department of the Animal Production
and Health Division (AGAH) or their website devoted to
avian influenza (www.fao.org/avianflu/en/index.html).
Finally, because the backyard poultry term is not uni-
versally used, we chose to inspect each identified article
or report, including those that referred to backyard
flocks and infectious agents or diseases. Our definition
of backyard poultry encompassed (1) similar terms such
as “indigenous poultry”, “native poultry”, “scavenging
poultry”, “village poultry”, “local poultry”, “traditional
poultry” or “free-range poultry” [5,27] and (2) small scale
semi-intensive systems (e.g. ducks free grazing in rice
fields) [3]. Backyard poultry is commonly associated with
poor biosecurity conditions, small size (under 100 heads
per flock) [2] and poultry raised by a family or in a
household in rural or peri-urban areas. Parallel to the
FAO classification (four sectors; 1: industrial ; 2 and 3:
commercial; 4: backyard) [28], our search would include
sectors 3 and 4. However, we purposely excluded from
the review the small-scale intensive poultry system, be-
cause of its different management system; a system char-
acterized by higher levels of biosecurity and overall
husbandry conditions [6,7]. We also excluded laboratory
studies, reviews about specific infectious diseases, stud-
ies that were not farm-based (all spatial studies and area,
national or regional biosecurity studies were excluded),
studies on vaccination or other treatments and those
whose contents were not scientific (Figure 1). Relevant
references found in the selected documents were also
searched and reviewed. Our search was restricted to arti-
cles and reports written in English or French.Results
The literature search identified 62 different references
relating to biosecurity issues in backyard flocks including
35 (56%) from PubMed, 18 (29%) from FAO reports
and nine (15%) additional reports from Google search
(Figure 1). However three documents (11%) - two on
Google search [29,30] and five on PubMed [31] – that
could not be obtained via the internet or our FAO con-
tacts were dismissed from the review. The 59 remain-
ing available documents referred to Europe (n = 1),



































Document given by FAO: 6
Animal Production and Health division 
website: 17
Research « poultry biosecurity »: 26
Documents about
-Species other than poultry
-Laboratory studies and general         
diseases
-Non communicable diseases
-General recommendations on 
national and regional biosecurity
-Recommendations for vaccination 
or treatment
-Biosecurity in commercial farms
FAO
Document given by FAO: 4
Animal Production and Health division 
website: 11
Research « poultry biosecurity »: 3
Exclusion criteria Search in 3 databases
Figure 1 Flow diagram of studies selection process, by database and keyword, to obtain the 62 reviewed documents.
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remaining documents did not refer to a particular area
(n = 6). Field study articles (i.e. 6 case–control studies,
25 cross-sectional studies and 1 prospective longitudinal
study) accounted for 54% (n = 32) of the relevant docu-
ments, followed by FAO reports (n = 12, 20%) and guide-
lines published by FAO or other organisations (n = 5,
8%). The ten other documents included descriptions of
projects, reports, modelling or review articles, and PhD
theses. Overall 23 documents (39%) provided precise
biosecurity-related recommendations at flock level.
Interestingly, there has been a surge in the number of
reviewed documents since 2004; prior to this date, only
four documents were found, dated 1998, 2000 and 2003.
Avian influenza (n = 38, 64%) was the predominantsubject of the documents we identified and selected.
One study on ND-related risk factors provided no rele-
vant results and was therefore not retained [32], redu-
cing the total number of identified documents to 58.
The relevant documents were summarized and pre-
sented in Additional file 1: Annex 1 according to biblio-
graphic information, research key (data base and
keywords), geographic distribution, type of study, objec-
tives given by authors, biosecurity-related findings and
recommendations.
The FAO and OIE (World Organisation for Animal
Health) define biosecurity as the implementation of
measures to reduce the risk of the introduction and
spread of disease agents [33,34]. Although ways of classi-
fying these measures may vary, they all refer to the
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fectious agents from entering the farm) and biocontain-
ment (i.e. preventing infectious agents from exiting) [35]
and were implemented via: segregation to raise barriers
to infectious diseases, cleaning and disinfection [33-35].
These two principles encompass the notions of (i) isola-
tion, which ensures no contamination of flocks through
housing and personal protection equipment; (ii) traffic
control, which restricts the movement of products,
stocks and persons; (iii) sanitation which includes meth-
ods for farmers to maintain disinfection and cleanliness
in flocks. Specific recommendations for backyard poultry
settings were found in ten FAO reports including eight
for African countries and two for Asian countries – only
engaging their authors – all of which referred to HPAI
A/H5N1-related risks. There, the recommendations on
biosecurity are listed by sector (described as sector 3
and sector 4) and/or type of recommendations [36-41]
or otherwise [42-45].
No standardized classification exists to describe biose-
curity measures. Based on the classification found in
FAO documents, we present the result of this review
using the following categories: flock management, feed
and water, trade and stock, health management and risk
to humans.
One recommended husbandry measure is to separate
poultry by age and species or to consider raising one
species instead of several [46], given that mixing species
increases HPAIA/H5N1 virus transmission [47]. Age
separation would facilitate the all in – all out strategy
whereby sanitary cleaning can be carried out between
the complete exit and renewal of flocks. However FAO
recognizes that age separation would not be feasible in
developing countries as most villagers raise free-ranging
poultry for their own consumption. Firstly, the sale of all
animals at a fixed age is not practiced by farmers, who
keep several ages to ensure meat production throughout
the year [34,41,48]. Secondly, farmers use their laying
hens to renew the flocks [49,50], so the production of
chicks can last throughout the year. Building fences to
separate species and limit free-ranging is an important
recommendation. On the one hand this measure is con-
sidered relatively affordable for farmers, as they can use
local materials [46,51-54]; on the other hand fencing
poultry increases the daily supplementary food require-
ments of the flock [6,14]. Indoor raising is also recom-
mended, and actually often followed by US backyard
poultry farmers [55]. However, recognizing the difficul-
ties in applying this measure in developing countries
[56,57], the authors nevertheless recommended at least
keeping poultry indoors at night [8,58]. Interestingly, in
many settings where the above housing recommenda-
tions are followed, farmers were motivated by non-
biosecurity related incentives, e.g. confinement withfences implemented to prevent robbery, avoid dirt enter-
ing the house or losing birds [59]. Moreover, as shown
by a study conducted in Nigeria, keeping flocks indoors
without knowing the basic principles of biosecurity
could actually expose humans to flocks, resulting in a
higher risk of HPAI A/H5N1 infection [48]. Other hus-
bandry measures involve cleaning and disinfecting the
surroundings, which proves particularly effective in
interrupting potential HPAI A/H5N1 [60]. Disinfection
would also include materials, people (footwear, hand-
washing) and buildings. All these measures are known
and frequently used for North American backyard
poultry [55,61,62] , while many farmers from developing
countries may not know how to use disinfectants to pro-
tect their birds [48,51,52,58,63,64].
Many studies confirmed the potential risk of small
backyard flocks roaming in or near waterlands and thus
being exposed to Avian Influenza or ND virus-infected
wild birds or contaminated environments [53,65,66].
The presence of ponds or canals was identified as in-
creasing the risk of HPAI outbreaks in the village and
the spread to neighbouring villages [60,67,68]. Again
despite high awareness of greater risk of HPAI virus
transmission from wild birds, contacts remain frequent
between domestic and wild birds as observed in Egypt
[63], the USA and New Zealand [55,62,65]. Authors
recommended the use of bird pens to mitigate contact
between domestic and wild birds [61]; however, no data
were found on the feasibility and effectiveness of such a
measure in HPAI A/H5N1 epidemic-prone countries.
Within husbandry practices, restricting people move-
ment limits the risk of introducing infectious agents into
flocks (e.g. HPAI) [47,48]. Some authors from countries
where intensive farms are well-developed raised the
issue of restricting contacts between commercial farms
and backyard poultry [51,55,61,63]. This principle of vis-
itor restriction appears to be well accepted among back-
yard poultry owners of developed or transitional
countries [61,62]. Another FAO recommendation with
respect to husbandry practices involves keeping a good
record of flock history [38]. This animal observation
allows the farmer to detect any changes in the flocks.
Moreover, in the case of investigation, events would be
easier to interpret if the flock history is known [8,53,61].
FAO recognizes food and water management as a bio-
security hazard to poultry, hence the need to account
for it [37,39,40,43]. Consequently, recommendations in-
clude providing supplemented food (if possible) or en-
suring clean containers for food and water [46,59].
However, there is evidence of an association between an
untreated water source for poultry and outbreaks of
HPAI A/H5N1 [68]. No practical solutions were pro-
posed to address the latter hazards for backyard poultry,
despite the need, as farmers from developing countries
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[53,65].
Health management includes the management of out-
breaks and the use of litter. When there is an outbreak
in the flock, sick birds should be separated as they may
be a potential risk for the transmission of infectious dis-
ease [26,27,39,41,69]. The culling of sick animals by
farmers was suggested as a radical measure in the US
[61] but is hardly applicable in developing countries,
where many farmers cannot afford to lose the entire
flock. In view of the HPAI A/H5N1 threat, there is a
strong, clearly-stated recommendation that dead birds
be buried or burned [46,51,70]. The disposal of sick ani-
mals and carcasses is common practice in developed
countries [61,65]. However, inappropriate implementa-
tion can increase the risk of ND infection [71] while
many villagers in developing countries continue to sell
sick or dead birds [14,72,73]. The use of untreated
poultry manure as fertilizer poses a serious risk of infec-
tion spread [46]. This can be addressed by composting
manure outside the flock area [46,61,65], a measure that
is efficient but not well known among village farmers of
many developing countries.
Poultry trading is often viewed as a risk factor
for HPAI or ND in the flock and the village [60,67,
68,71,74,75]. Backyard poultry farmers are therefore
advised to avoid visiting live bird markets or other trad-
ing places [46,61]. However, this practice persists in
many developing countries [8,48]. Poultry farmers are
also advised to ensure that the poultry supply source is
disease-free [37]. Ways of applying these recommenda-
tions were observed for instance in a study from Myan-
mar where farmers tend to purchase from a known and
regular stock source such as their neighbours – provided
the flock is disease free - rather than at live bird markets
[14]. This principle is particularly well understood in
developed countries where it is common practice in
North America or New Zealand for backyard poultry
owners to hatch their own eggs [65] or to buy chicks (or
same age young adult birds) from one or a small number
of the same commercial sources [55,61,62]. Because the
risk of HPAI A/H5N1 transmission is actually higher
when birds are brought in from another backyard flock
[60], the subsequent related crucial recommendation is
that newly introduced birds should be quarantined for
two weeks before joining the flock to allow a time-lag
for any disease to reveal itself [55,61].
Lastly, recommendations are made to limit the risk to
humans. This includes separating children from poultry
[52,54,59,63] and personal hygiene measures like hand
washing or wearing gloves when handling poultry
[55,63,76].
All the above recommendations are listed in different
guidelines. Some were published by Agronomes etVétérinaires Sans Frontières (AVSF) as recommenda-
tions for Cambodia, Vietnam and the Caribbean
[33,77,78] or by DEFRA in the United Kingdom [79].
One of the articles also mentioned recommendations for
avian influenza in all sectors [35] while two focused on
backyard flocks [54,80]. These documents introduce the
principles of biosecurity, and provide a list of the mea-
sures described above for application ranging from back-
yard flocks to veterinary paraprofessionals. A guide for
professionals has been drawn up for ND [69]. Measures
are also listed by Sharma et al. [81] giving the keys for
developing biosecurity in Nepalese farms.
There are few publications (11) available that describe
or analyse the impact of biosecurity measures on back-
yard flocks. Among these, three studies showed that in-
formation campaigns on flock management would
improve the “general condition of the flock” [8,46,82].
Secondly, model-based evidence showed the positive
economic effects of biosecurity in backyard poultry [68].
In articles about biosecurity, impact is confused with in-
put or process indicators such as the number of trained
people. Nevertheless, there is a general understanding
that interventions require community participation and
ownership to be successful [83,84]. Other papers on bio-
security input conclude that gender and age analyses
should be included in husbandry and training study, be-
cause knowledge of HPAI A/H5N1 for example is corre-
lated with socio-economic factors [85]. However,
behaviour towards biosecurity varies according to other
social factors (marital status for example), hence the in-
clusion of gender and economic strategy analysis to pro-
mote adequate intervention [70,86-88].Discussion
This review confirms the challenges of raising backyard
poultry in such a way as to limit poultry deaths or mor-
bidity due to well-known infectious agents, and discusses
how to abide by biosecurity measures that are adapted
and financially acceptable [54]. Although basic principles
of biosecurity are undisputed regardless of poultry sec-
tor, few documents have been published about the im-
pact and efficiency of biosecurity measures in backyard
poultry flocks. As a result, guidelines on specific recom-
mendations for improving biosecurity are limited. We
found few FAO recommendations, most of which were
written in the form of reports following specific country
requests or consultancies that only engage their authors.
Interestingly, the large majority of these documents have
been issued since 2004, as they referred to or were
requested following the pandemic threat posed by HPAI
A/H5N1 virus infection in humans and birds. Most of
these documents were funded by short term projects
specifically geared towards emergency response to HPAI
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vest in a long-term program. Even in the US and other
developed countries, only fact sheets are produced by
different organizations or universities [89,90]. There ap-
pear to be no national guidelines with practical informa-
tion about biosecurity for backyard poultry [61].
Secondly, scientific articles looking at specific, adapted
solutions to improve the control of infectious diseases in
backyard poultry in developing countries are scarce.
Despite the fact that 80% of the global poultry popula-
tion is backyard-raised [3,4], some recommendations in
the guidelines or reports are based on indirect evidence
as to their efficiency and technical feasibility. However, a
number of financial constraints were recognized in
implementing these measures in a resource-poor setting.
With the exception of one economic model [91], there
are virtually no cost-benefit studies using field data.
Guidelines have been issued to train farmers on how to
reduce contacts with domestic birds and increase biose-
curity in backyard flocks [33,69,77,78]. Studies showed
that despite these training programmes and high aware-
ness of transmission risk due to HPAI A/H5N1, a signifi-
cant proportion of villagers continue their at-risk
behaviours and practices; like in Egypt and elsewhere,
many families rely on backyard poultry for their liveli-
hood contributing to food security [64,76]. This discrep-
ancy is likely explained by the fact that measures are
often costly and may not be adapted to the economic
considerations inherent to backyard poultry [54]. As
reported many villagers tend to change their practices
when these measures are economically beneficial [92,93].
Free ranging, for instance, is practised to enable easier
and cheap access to feed on the ground or water from
ponds or rivers. There is a paucity of data demonstrating
the real impact of these measures [72]. Instead, we were
only able to identify studies on the impact or effective-
ness of these measures, evaluated according to the num-
ber of trained people [84] or the absence of outbreaks
without control groups [82]. We are left with the im-
pression that the proposed lists of recommendations
were made without weighing biosecurity measures
according to prioritization criteria, efficiency or financial
and technical feasibility. Indeed, we believe that these
control measures often derive from facts and evidence
demonstrated in intensive sectors [94-96]. Compared
with backyard poultry sector related studies, the number
of studies from Pubmed on biosecurity in commercial
farms is much higher (46 versus 15 for intensive and
backyard respectively) (data not shown). As a major glo-
bal industry, poultry mass production warrants the high-
est level of biosecurity to prevent the introduction and
transmission of known pathogens. Resources have there-
fore been made available to optimize profits by identify-
ing the most cost-effective measures using sound, robustmethodologies such as cluster randomized and con-
trolled trials [94].
Biosecurity implementation requires awareness, resour-
ces and the perception of higher risk and loss of profit.
Unfortunately, as these conditions are not met, there is
insufficient interest in the need to protect backyard
poultry. This situation is likely related to multiple factors
including a combination of the low economic import-
ance of backyard poultry worldwide, absence of syner-
getic interests in zoonotic diseases between public health
and livestock-related health, and the fact that backyard
poultry is thought to pose little infectious disease-related
risk to commercial farms [34,97]. Firstly, poultry rearing
is often a secondary activity, a means of generating add-
itional food high in protein content and nutritional value
[27], and of generating additional income [26,92]. Imple-
mentation of basic biosecurity measures in villages to
safeguard poultry is not seen as a priority. When there
is low investment in poultry rearing, mortality is com-
mon, and is not seen as damaging for the household
[13,14]. Secondly, prior to the occurrence of HPAI A/
H5N1 epidemics and epizootics, most infectious diseases
affecting backyard poultry were of little or no concern
for public health. Many of these infections were non-
zoonotic or involved mild infection in humans (e.g. ND,
Fowl cholera) and outbreaks due mostly to salmonella
or campylobacter from backyard poultry to humans
rarely cause human death and often go undetected or
under-recognized in developing countries [98,99].
Thirdly, it is thought that in developed countries com-
mercial operations or farms that practice good biosecur-
ity have fairly low transmission from backyard flocks
[62]. In investigations conducted in North America or
Europe backyard flocks appeared to have played little
part in disease spread between commercial poultry farms
[97,100,101]; hence the low investment for public health
research on biosecurity adapted to backyard flocks
throughout the world.
Although biosecurity is not a recent issue, the threat
of HPAI A/H5N1 since 2004 to humans and poultry
production (in terms of public health and economy) has
underlined the lack of biosecurity in backyard farms in
developing countries. Backyard flocks in high HPAI A/
H5N1 virus transmission areas were initially thought as
having a higher likelihood of HPAI A/H5N1 infection
than commercial flocks because of higher frequency of
exposure to wild birds [102-104]. Although spatio-
temporal studies have proved the presence of free range
duck flocks as a risk factor of HPAI A/H5N1 at regional
level [105], recent studies indicate instead a lower risk of
HPAI A/H5N1 in backyard flocks at farm level [106-
109]. The current view is that no system is more to
blame for infectious disease spread, and that biosecurity
levels have to be increased in both commercial and
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transmission of HPAI A/H5N1 is officially enzootic in 4
countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Egypt)
according to FAO [111] and probably in other countries
such as Cambodia [112]. Even drastic biosecurity in
commercial poultry production systems in both the
developed and developing worlds would hardly prevent
the introduction of HPAI A/H5N1 or other infectious
agents in the free-disease areas if biosecurity in the
backyard sector does not increase dramatically. As
shown in California, USA, exotic ND was transmitted to
commercial farms in multiple geographic regions by bird
and human movements associated with the backyard-
flock sector [113].
Admittedly, our review may not be exhaustive and
complete. We may well have missed unpublished obser-
vations and studies, particularly those conducted at a
small scale or as part of a community development pro-
ject. Indeed, many of the latter projects may have
involved assessing biosecurity measures that improved
livestock production in rural areas. Nevertheless, should
these data exist, the appropriate evaluation of measures
for backyard poultry settings is lacking and practical in-
formation is not readily available.
To date, control of HPAI A/H5N1 in endemic coun-
tries has basically relied on poultry vaccination (e.g.
China, Indonesia, Egypt or Vietnam) and massive culling
whenever HPAI A/H5N1 is detected [114,115]. However,
these interventions have been difficult to sustain [116].
Furthermore, their efficiency in eliminating the virus
from the poultry population is yet to be evidenced: vac-
cination as in Egypt [116] or culling with or without
compensation policies as in Southeast Asia [117] can
prove counterproductive i.e. economic losses that dis-
courage reporting [118]; and new costs related to vaccin-
ation are not readily supported by backyard poultry
farmers. In view of the mounting evidence that HPAI A/
H5N1 can be transmitted through contaminated envir-
onments [119,120], we recommend that biosecurity
measures, if appropriate, should be better promoted as
a crucial intervention in containing H5N1 circulation.
The international animal and public health community
should encourage further research or projects to iden-
tify sustainable measures, which must be practical and
proportionate to the risk [34,115]. In addition, we be-
lieve that the correct approach to zoonotic diseases
should be holistic, based on the principle of improving
personal and community hygiene to prevent all infec-
tious diseases in backyard poultry to eventually mitigate
exposure and transmission risk to humans. The keys
to success and sustainability would undoubtedly involve
engaging the community [34] and assessing the impact
and economic benefit of a healthy livestock thanks to
community hygiene.Conclusion
Our review confirmed that biosecurity is considered as
an indispensable tool to mitigate the spread of infectious
diseases. However, many recommendations for backyard
flocks are not entirely practical. No general guidelines
were found for backyard poultry-related biosecurity in
developing countries. Although biosecurity principles
of isolation and containment remain, few documents
were found about the impact of measures in backyard
settings and none gave any evidence of their feasibility
and effectiveness. Moreover, most of the studies were
short-term research and lacked evaluations of the sus-
tainability of the recommended biosecurity measures.
Long-term national programs should be envisaged in
the future. Given the persistent threat posed by HPAI A/
H5N1 to humans in developing countries, our findings
highlight the importance of encouraging applied re-
search toward identifying sustained and adapted biose-
curity measures for backyard poultry flocks in low
income settings.Additional file
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